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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is very attractive because
of its promises. However, it brings many challenges, mainly
issues about privacy preserving and lightweight cryptography.
Many schemes have been designed so far but none of them
simultaneously takes into account these aspects. In this paper,
we propose an efficient ABC scheme for IoT devices. We use
ECC without pairing, blind signing and zero knowledge proof.
Our scheme supports block signing, selective disclosure and
randomization. It provides data minimization and transactions’
unlinkability. Our construction is efficient since smaller key size
can be used and computing time can be reduced. As a result, it
is a suitable solution for IoT devices characterized by three major
constraints namely low energy power, small storage capacity and
low computing power.
Index Terms—
IoT, Credential, Privacy, Anonymity, ECC, ZKP, PK, Blind
signing, Selective disclosure
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet has changed our way of living. In fact, it has
become an integral part of our life. As a ubiquitous commu-
nication platform, it has undergone remarkable development
in recent years. The concept of IoT has been emerged
and envisages to integrate all real-world objects into the
Internet. The evolution of IoT concept has given rise to
others concepts such as IoE for Internet of Everything or
IoV for Internet of Vulnerabilities. Some people even talk
about IoP[1] for Internet of People. According to Cisco
forecasts[2], there would be 50 billions connected devices
by 2020.
In most cases, communications between devices require
authentication itself based on authentication factors[3]. Au-
thentication is also based on identification which makes
activities of an entity traceable since each device is directly
or indirectly associated with its owner. The current infras-
tructure is based on centralized architecture which allows
no control of data by their owners; this is a threat to privacy
preserving. Security in current infrastructures is guaranteed
in most cases by PKIs (Public Key Infrastructures) that
can guarantee that messages are not compromised and
only recipients are able to open and read them (integrity,
confidentiality and authenticity are guaranteed). PKIs main
objective is to guarantee keys encryption authenticity. How-
ever, they cannot protect users’ privacy and users cannot get
a credential on a subset of their attributes without letting
the CA (Certification authority) see the resulting credential.
Moreover, when authenticating to a service provider, users
must show their whole credential instead of just proving
their eligibility for that access. We must therefore think to
migrate to decentralized architectures and user-centric.
The ultimate challenges can be summarized to this
fundamental question: How to minimize the amount
of data disclosed about oneself and provide only the
bare minimum necessary ? Nowadays, to the best of
our knowledge, the most convenient way to protect users’
privacy remains using anonymous credential systems also
known as Attribute-Based Credentials (ABCs). ABCs are
building blocks for user-centric identity management[4].
With ABCs, it is possible to get a signature on a set of
attributes and then use this later to access others services.
Seeing the abstractness of some attributes (nationality, age
class, occupation, affiliation, profession, etc.), the entire
mechanism can remain anonymous and therefore guarantees
concerned entities’ privacy. Authentication is carried out by
revealing the bare minimum necessary. Better, it is possible,
for a set of attributes, to prove their possession instead
of revealing their values; from where the concept I2PA
meaning "I Prove Possession of Attributes".
There are two major families of ABC systems, namely
those based on blind signatures (BS) and those based on
zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). In terms of anonymous cre-
dential, there are two flagship schemes; Idemix of IBM and
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U-prove of Microsoft[5]. While Idemix’s building block[6]
is based on Camenish-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [7]
(CL-Signature), U-prove is based on Stefan Brand’s digital
signature[8] instead. Nowadays, there are many contribu-
tions (U-prove, Idemix, IRMA of Radboud University
of Nijmegen[9] based on Idemix, etc.). However, when
tackling privacy concerns, none of this schemes is fully
adapted in an IoT environment characterized by three ma-
jor constraints namely low computing power, very limited
storage capacity and low energy autonomy. In fact, these
models are based either on RSA cryptosystem[10] or on
Pairing-Based Cryptography[11]. Some of them are based
on ECC without pairing (U-prove for instance) but do not
fully take into account some fundamental features relative
to privacy preserving. Indeed, Lucjan et al.[12] showed
that unlinkability feature is not fully taken into account
by U-prove. With reference to RSA based cryptosytems,
the major problem remains keys’ size which will neces-
sarily rise problem of storage, performance in computing
time and bandwidth usage. Pairing-based cryptosystems,
although considered as very robust, are not applicable in
an IoT context seeing that they are too greedy in term of
computing time. The relative computation cost of a pairing
is approximately twenty times higher than that of the scalar
multiplication. The model presented by Gergely et al.[13]
is very efficient in a sensor network but does not guarantee
anonymity since the verifier has a database of identifiers.
Fuentes et al.[14] present a very interesting result in Vehic-
ular ad hoc network but their scheme lacks generality. Even
if Idemix is the most advanced in terms of implementation,
it is subject of improvement. Authors in[15] show that
at equal security level, an RSA key is at least six times
longer than an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key.
Further, in major cases, operations are faster on ECC than
in RSA based schemes. Another important point is that,
in an RSA cryptosystem, when keys’ size are no longer
sufficient to guarantee a secure level, it is recommended
to double their size what is not necessarily the case for
ECC cryptosystem. Another important contribution [16] is
build on top of Idemix scheme. It has been successfully
implemented, deployed, and tested. However, the criticisms
of Idemix remain valid toward it. The U-prove scheme,
by its generality, can be implemented either on the basis of
subgroup or using ECC. However, as shown by Lucjan et
al.[12], unlinkability feature is not fully taken into account.
Indeed, if a token is presented twice to a verifier, then
the later knows that it is the same token. This means that
unlinkability in U-prove can be achieved only by using
different credentials[17], what requires the client device to
have additional storage space.
The relevance of our contribution lies in the fact that
it offers a good level of security and drastically reduces
keys’ size. Credentials’ randomizations, selective disclosure
and unlinkability features are very interesting results that
contribute in guaranteeing non traceability. Edwards curves,
known as the curves in which cryptographic calculations
are faster[18], are privileged. We then win in memory us-
age, performance in computing time and bandwidth usage.
Analysis presented in section 6 show that our scheme is
very efficient. Its level of abstractness makes it applicable
in any IoT environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as flow. We start
by reviewing some mathematic backgrounds in section 2
while definitions of some flagship concepts are presented in
section 3. Section 4 presents an architecture of ABC system
and in section 5, our contribution is presented. Section 6 is
related to complexity analysis and this paper is ended by a
conclusion and perspectives in section 7.
2 MATHEMATIC BACKGROUND
Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) was presented in-
dependently by Koblitz[19] and Miller[20] in the 80s. Their
structure of group and performance in computing time they
offer make them a new direction in cryptography. The
following section is a brief description on ECC.
2.1 Définition
An Elliptic Curve E over a field K can be described as the
set of K× K satisfying the equation :
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (1)
where ai ∈ K to which we add a point at infinity O,
defined as the intersection of all vertical lines. An additional
requirement is that the curve must be "smooth", which
means that the partial derivations ∂E
∂y
and ∂E
∂x
have no
common zeros. Depending on the characteristic of the field
K, the equation below can be simplified[3][?].
1) When char(K) 6= 2, 3 the equation can be simplified
to y2 = x3 + ax+ b, where a, b ∈ K.
2) When char(K) = 2 and a1 6= 0, the equation can
be simplified to y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, where a,
b ∈ K. This curve is said to be non-supersingular. If
a1 = 0, the equation can be simplified to y
2 + cy =
x3 + ax + b,where a, b, c ∈ K. This curve is said to
be supersingular.
3) When char(K) = 3 and a21 6= −a2 the equation can
be simplified to y2 = x3 + ax2 + b, where a, b ∈ K.
This curve is said to be non-supersingular. If a21 =
−a2, the equation can be simplified to y2 = x3+ax+
b, a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be supersingular.
The "figure 1" is an illustration of the curve y2 = x3−x
over R.
Theorem 2.1 (Hasse’s theorem). Let E be an elliptic curve
defined over a finite field K with q elements, then the result
of Hasse states that : |#E(K)− q − 1| ≤ 2√q
2.2 Edwadrs’ curves
Edwards, generalizing an example from Euler and Gauss,
introduced an addition law for the curves x2+y2 = c2(1+
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Figure 1: An Elliptic Curve of equation y2 = x3 − x orver R
x2y2) over a non-binary field K. He showed that every
elliptic curve over a non-binary field K can be expressed
in the form x2 + y2 = c2(1 + x2y2) if K is algebraically
closed. Bernstein and Lange[21] generalized the addition
law of the curves x2+y2 = c2(1+dx2y2). Let char(K) 6=
2, 3 and let E(K) has a unique point of order 2. Then, E
can be written in Edwards form :
Ed : x
2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, where d /∈ {0, 1} (2)
Let P1(x1, y1), P2(x2, y2) and P3(x3, y3) be points of
the curve such that P3 = P1
⊕
P2. The Edwards addition
law over Ed is described as follow :
(x3, y3) = (
x1y2 + x2y1
1 + dx1x2y1y2
,
y1y2 − x1x2
1− dx1x2y1y2 )
This group law is complete and strongly uniform. The
doubling operation is given by the following equation :
2(x, y) = (
2xy
x2 + y2
,
y2 − x2
2− x2 − y2 )
This addition law presents interesting results :
• If d is a non-square in K, the addition law is complete.
This ensures that denominators are never zero.
• The addition law is strongly unified, i.e., it can be also
used for doubling.
• The point (0,1) is the neutral element.
• The point (0,-1) has order 2.
• The points (±1,0) have order 4.
• The inverse of (x, y) is (−x, y).
Addition in Edwards curve is known to be the fastest
among all families of elliptic curves used to implement
Cryptography.
2.3 Elliptic Curve Discret Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP)
The basic operations of ECC are point scalar computations
(also known as scalar multiplication) of the form :
Q = k.P = P + P + . . .+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) is the problem of retrieving k given P and Q,
where P and Q are points of the curve and k is an integer
uniformly chosen at random in the interval [1,r-1](r denotes
the order of P). The assumed difficulty of this problem is the
basis of security in elliptic curve public key cryptosystems.
Point scalar multiplication can be performed efficiently
using algorithms such as Double-and-Add .
3 DEFINITION
The aim of this section is to define some leading terms
in this paper namely attribute, credential, blind signing and
zero-knowledge-proof.
3.1 Attribute
An attribute is a characteristic or a qualification of a
person. It can either be an identifying or non-identifying
property. For example, "full name", "address", "social
security number", are identifying attributes. Attributes
such as "is a student" and "is a teenager" are non-
identifying as they do not uniquely identify a person; such
properties can belong to other people as well.
3.2 Credential
A credential is a set of attributes digitally signed by a
trusted third party(issuer). In others words, a set of attributes
together with the corresponding cryptographic information.
A credential is similar to a certificate in terms of content but
they are different in the way they are used. While certificate
usage requires showing all its content, a credential can
be used by showing some parts and hiding or proving
knowledge of others. Credentials are important in identity
management systems. They certify that an entity has certain
characteristics, knowledges, skills, etc. One main point
is that credentials involve attributes of an entity without
including identity information which allows linking the
credential to its owner. As illustrated in the "figure 2", a
credential has three main parts: a secret key of its owner, a
set of attributes and a signature of an issuer on that set of
attributes. A credential includes others informations such as
expiry date.
Figure 2: Credential’s structure
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3.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
The past decades have witnessed the emergence of
several new cryptographic notions. In 1985, Goldwasser,
Micali and Rackoff [22] introduced the concept of zero-
knowledge interactive proofs that enables an entity, a
prover, to convince another entity, a verifier, of the validity
of a statement without revealing anything else beyond the
assertion of this statement. Zero-Knowledge Proofs are
elegant techniques to limit the amount of information trans-
ferred from a prover to a verifier in a cryptographic protocol.
The "table 1" describes Schnorr’s proof of knowledge also
known as Schnorr’s Identification protocol. Given a group
G of prime order q, in which the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP) is hard, and a generator g (〈g〉 = G), a prover
proves to a verifier that he knows a secret value x, uniformly
chosen at random from Z∗q , corresponding to a public value
h = gx ∈ G.
Table 1: Schnorr’s proof of knowledge
Prover
Secret x
Public
q, g, h =
gx
Verifier
w ∈R Z∗q
a = gw in G
c = cx+ w(mod q)
a−−−−−→
c←−−−−−
r−−−−−→
c ∈R Zq
a
?
= gr.h−c
in G
There is a formal symbolic notation of ZKP as described
in "equation 3".
PK{(α) : h = gα} (3)
3.4 Blind signing
In many applications involving anonymity, it is often
desirable to allow a participant to sign a document without
knowing its content; this is known as blind signature. It is
typically used in privacy-related protocols where the signer
and credential owner are different parties. It can be used in
e-cash or privacy-vote.
3.5 Blindness
Let U0 and U1 be two honest users and A be a PPT
(Probabilistic Polynomial-Time) adversary which plays the
role of the signer engaged in the issuing scheme with U0
and U1 on messages mb and m1−b where b is chosen
uniformly at random in {0, 1}. U0 and U1 output the
signatures σb and σ1−b. After that, (mb,m1−b, σb, σ1−b)
is sent to A which outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. For all A, U0, U1,
constant c, large n, we have |Pr[b = b′]| < n−c.
4 ARCHITECTURE
A general architecture of Privacy-ABC consists of three
main entities, a User (credential owner also known as
Prover), an Issuer (trusted third party or credential signer )
and a Verifier (services provider or secure resource owner).
The Issuer issues credential(s) for a User, which can later be
used for authentication purposes. Such an architecture may
optionally include an entity that takes care of revocation of
credentials (Revocation authority) and another entity (In-
spector) that can revoke the anonymity of users. Inspection
and revocation are beyond the scope of this paper. The main
phases are described in the following section.
• Set-up : Performed to output system’s parameters
• Issuance : An interactive protocol between a User
and an Issuer. By issuing a credential to a User, the
Issuer guarantees the correctness of attributes’ values
contained in the credential.
• Presentation : An interactive protocol in which a
User reveals or proves possession of some attributes
or claims about attributes. This phase is also known as
verification.
• Inspection : Provides conditional anonymity. It en-
ables a trusted party, the so called Inspector, to revoke,
in some conditions, anonymity of cheating provers.
• Revocation : Ends the validity of credentials whenever
necessary.
All those phases are illustrated in "figure 3".
Figure 3: General architecture of ABC system
At the core of Privacy-ABCs systems, untraceability
and unlinkability are the most important privacy-related
features. Additional features are also supported[17][4],
without exhaustivity, we cite.
• Authenticity : Refers to the feature that guarantees
that the content of an ABC signed by the issuer cannot
be modified
• Non-transferability : Refers to the feature that guar-
antees that prevents the user from transferring her ABC
to another user of the system.
• Minimal information : Refers to the privacy feature
that guarantees that during the verification protocols
no other information is revealed to the verifier beyond
the disclosed attributes, the credential names and the
corresponding issuers.
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• Multi-show unlinkability : Refers to the privacy
feature that guarantees that different presentations of
a given credential cannot be linked.
• Issuance unlinkability : Refers to the privacy feature
which guarantees that the presentation of a credential
cannot be linked to its issuance.
• Selective disclosure : Allows a user to prove only a
subset of attributes to a verifier.
• Carry-over attributes : Enables users to carry over
some attributes from an existing credential into a new
one without disclosing them to the Issuer.
• Predicate proof : Allows logical operators, such as
greater or smaller than, to be applied on attributes
without disclosing them;
• Prove of holdership : A cryptographic evidence for
proving ownership or possession of a credential.
• Unforgeability : Refers to the feature that guarantees
that none malicious third party can forge a valid ABC.
• Etc.
5 CONTRIBUTION
In this sections, our scheme is described. We focus on
three main phases namely set-up, issuance and verification
(showing, presentation). We also present a selective disclo-
sure protocol and randomization of credential.
5.1 Set-up
The set-up is the first algorithm to be ran to extract
system’s parameters from a security parameter k. This
algorithm is described as follows :
• {p, E(Fp), P, Ppub,H } ←− 1k
Where :
• k : a security parameter
• p : a prime number that defines the field Fp.
• E : an elliptic curve defined over Fp.
• P ∈ E(Fp) : a base point of prime order q.
• x ∈R F∗q : issuer’s secret key.
• Ppub = x.P : issuer’s public key.
• H : a hash function defined as follow :
H :E(Fp)2 −−−→ F∗p
(P,Q) 7−−−−→ H(P,Q)
5.2 Issuance
When the set-up algorithm is successfully ran, the
system’s parameters are available and ready to be used.
The issuer is ready to issue credentials. When a user wants
to be issued a credential, he runs an interactive algorithm
with the issuer at the end of which a credential should
be issued for him. Issuance unlinkability property should
be ensured. The way it is done is that not only the issuer
can not store the issued credential but also, thanks to the
blinding mechanism, he may not see the credential’s content
while signing. The issuing protocol on a single message is
an interactive protocol of three steps between Prover and
Issuer as described below :
• Blinding : The issuer starts by generating a random
integer k¯ ∈ F∗q , computes the resulting point R¯ = k¯.P
and sends R¯ to the User. After receiving R¯, the User
generates random factors α and β. He blinds his
document and sends it to the Issuer. The User should
prove knowledge of m0, this is very important to
guarantee unforgeability.
• Singing : After receiving the blinded document, the
Issuer signs it with his secret key x by computing
s¯ ≡ h¯x+ k¯(mod q). He sends the blinded and signed
document to the User.
• Unblinding : After receiving the blinded and signed
document, the User unblinds it with his blind factors
α and β without invalidating it. He can also verify that
the signature is correctly computed.
5.3 Signature on a single message
For convenient notation, all proofs of knowledge would
be noted PK . The corresponding proofs is those mentioned
in the so called protocol. All the details of the issuing
protocol on a single message are described in "table 2".
Table 2: Issuance protocol on a single message
User :sk Public :pk Issuer : x
Blinding
α, β ∈R F∗q
R = α.R¯ + β.P
P0 = m0.P
h = H(P0, R)
h¯ ≡ hα−1(mod q)
PK{(µ) : P0 =
µ.P}
Verification
s¯.P
?
= h¯.Ppub + R¯
Unblinding
s ≡ αs¯+ β(mod q)
Outputs (R,s) the
blind version of
(R¯, s¯)
R¯←−−−−−−−
h¯,P0,PK−−−−−−−→
s¯←−−−−−−−
k¯ ∈R
F
∗
q , R¯ = k¯.P
Signing
s¯ ≡ h¯x+
k¯(mod q)
Theorem 5.1. The prosed scheme is fully blind.
Proof. From s¯ ≡ h¯x + k¯(mod q), we have α ≡ hx(s¯ −
k¯)−1(mod q). Thus α ∈ F∗q is unique. It follows that β ≡
s − αs¯(mod q) is also unique. Thus, there always exist
α and β, regardless of (R¯, h¯, s¯) and (m,R, s), such that
(R¯, h¯, s¯) and (m,R, s) have the same relation. Therefore,
an adversary A outputs a correct value b′ with probability
exactly 12 . As a result, the issuing protocol is fully blind.
Theorem 5.2. The proposed scheme is (ǫ′, t′, qi, qh)-
secure in the sense of unforgeability under chosen message
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attack (UE-CMA) in the random oracle model, assum-
ing that the (ǫ, t)-ECDL assumption holds in 〈P 〉, where
t′ = t+O(qi)T , ǫ′ = (1− qhqiq )(1− 1q )( 1qh )ǫ and qi, qh
are the number of issue and hashing queries, respectively,
the adversary is allowed to perform while T denotes the
time for a scalar multiplication operation.
Proof. Assuming that there exists a forger A that can forge
a credential while playing the game of chosen message
attack (CMA)[23], we construct an algorithmMA that uses
A to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Without losing
generality, we assume that qiqh < q. The following section
is adapted from the proof presented by Joseph K Lui et
al[24].
• Setup: MA receives the problem P1 :
(k, p, q, E(Fp), P, Psec) and should find x such
that Psec = x.P . It chooses a hash function
H which behaves like a random oracle, sets
Ppub = Psec and sends the public parameters
(k, p, q, E(Fp), P, Ppub,H) to A expecting it forges
a credential. MA and A start playing the game of
chosen message attack[23].
• Hashing oracle:MA starts by initializing and empty
database. When A sendsmi for hashing,MA checks
whether or not that message has already been sent.
If so, it picks hi from database and returns it as a
response to that query, otherwise it picks hi uniformly
at random from F∗p ,stores the couple (mi, hi) in the
database and returns hi as a response to that query.
• Issuing oracle: When A queries the issuing oracle
for the message mi, MA first checks whether mi
has already been queried for issuing. If so, it aborts
and the game is stopped (Event 1)[23], otherwise,
it computes hi = RO(mi)(where RO denotes the
hashing oracle), picks random value si from F
∗
p, com-
putes Ri = si.P − hi.Ppub and sends (Ri, si) to A
as response to its issuing query. As we can see, the
algorithm is valid since si.P = hi.Ppub +Ri.
• Forging step: Finally A outputs a forged signature
σ∗ = (s∗, R∗) on message m∗ with h∗. It computes
s∗−r∗
h∗
and extracts x as solution of the DLP.
• Probability analysis: The simulation fails ifA queries
the same message for issuing (Event 1). This happens
with probabilité at most ( qh
q
). Hence, the simulation
is successful with probability at least (1− qh
q
)qi ≥
(1− qhqi
q
) (provable by recurrence reasoning). The
tuple (m∗, R∗, s∗) is a valid credential with proba-
bility at least 1− 1
q
andMA guesses it correctly with
probability at least 1
qh
[24]. Finally, the overall success-
ful probability is ǫ′ = (1 − qhqi
q
)(1 − 1
q
)( 1
qh
)ǫ[24].
The time complexity of the algorithm MA is t′ =
t+O(qi)T since the issuing oracle computes at most
2qiT scalar multiplications.
5.4 Verification
Once the credential is issued, the user can be authenti-
cated by a service provider. As for the issuing algorithm,
he must perform an interactive protocol with the service
provider at the end of which an access to the so called
service might be granted or denied. The prover must prove
knowledge of his secret key. This guarantees unforgeability
property. The verifying protocol is described in "table 3".
Table 3: Verification protocol
Prover :sk Public :pk Verifier
Keeps secret (R¯, s¯)
PK{(µ) : P0 =
µ.P}
(R,s),h,PK
−−−−−−−→
s.P
?
=
h.Ppub +R
5.5 Randomized version
With rapid development of modern technologies, many
digital services involved in our life emphasize user privacy.
Blind signature is a well-known technique to address pri-
vacy concerns. When a user presents the same signature
(R, s) multiple times, he could be traceable; R, s could
be stored by the verifier even if this can not be linked to
issuance. The randomized version allows a user to derive
a random signature from a valid one without invalidating
it. The randomization feature is fundamental because it
contributes in guaranteeing multi-show unlinkability. The
prover generates a random factor r from which a random
signature (Rˆ, sˆ) is derived. The randomization process is
described in "table 4".
Table 4: Randomization protocol
Prover :sk Public :pk Verifier
r ∈R F∗q
sˆ ≡ s+ r(mod q)
Rˆ = R+ r.P
(Rˆ,sˆ),h,PK
−−−−−−−→ sˆ.P
?
=
h.Ppub + Rˆ
5.6 Signature on a block of messages
A credential rarely contains one attribute. In this section,
we consider a credential of l attributes (m1, ...,ml). The
issuing protocol on a block of messages is described in
"table 5" . The verification protocol remains the same as in
section 5.4.
Table 5: Issuance protocol on a block of messages
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User : sk Public :pk Issuer: x
Blinding
α, β ∈R F∗q
R ≡ α.R¯ + β.P
h =
∏l
i=0H(Pi, R)
Where Pi = mi.P
h¯ ≡ hα−1(mod q)
PK{(µ) : P0 =
µ.P}
Verification
s¯.P
?
= h¯.Ppub + R¯
Unblinding
s ≡ αs¯+ β(mod q)
Outputs (R,s) the
blind version of
(R¯, s¯)
R¯←−−−−−−−
h¯,P0,PK−−−−−−−→
s¯←−−−−−−−
k¯ ∈R
F
∗
q , R¯ = k¯.P
Signing
s¯ ≡ h¯x+
k¯(mod q)
5.7 Selective disclosure
The fundamental principle of privacy master is data
minimization. Selective disclosure is a way to achieve this.
It is the ability of an individual to granularly decide what
information to share. In our context , it is a very interesting
feature that lets a user decides what attributes to disclose
while being authenticated. How user and verify agreed on
the attributes to disclose is beyond the scope of this paper.
After convinced about hidden and revealed attributes, the
verifier grants access to the prover. More concretely, in the
selective disclosure protocol, the prover decides to disclose
a subset of attributes, let us say mn+1,mn+2, ...,mn+l
while m0,m1, ...,mn remain secret. The selective disclo-
sure protocol is described in "table 6".
Table 6: Selective disclosure protocol
Prover : m0,m1, ...,mn Public
:pk
Verifier
PK{(s,R, µ0, ..., µn) :∏n
i=0H(Pi, R).Ppub =
(
∏l
i=n+1H(Pi, R))−1(s.P−
R)∧
Pi = µi.P, 0 ≤ i ≤ n }
(R,s),h,PK
−−−−−−→ s.P
?
=
h.Ppub+
R
6 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Design an algorithm is good, design an efficient al-
gorithm is better. Let P be a problem, M1 and M2 two
methods designed to solve P. Answer to the question:
which of the methods M1 and M2 is more efficient is not
trivial unless one knows their complexity. A complexity
is a mathematical approximation to estimate the number
of operations and/or memory required for an algorithm to
solve a problem. A good algorithm must therefore use as
little memory as possible and make the processor work less
than possible. In the remain of this section, we adopt the
following notations :
• Ms : Scalar multiplication over EC
• Ap : Point adding over EC
• I : Inversion
• A : Addition
• M : Multiplication
• P : Elevation to power
This section aims to compare complexities of schemes
Idemix, U-prove and I2PA.While tackling IoT devices, the
case of Idemix could be left behind because a basic RSA
operation (inversion or elevation to power on large numbers)
is more expensive than a well designed operation on an
EC[15][25]. It should be noted that basic arithmetic opera-
tions such as addition and multiplication are negligible, in
terms of resource consumption, compared to operations in
elliptic curves or RSA base operations (power elevation and
inversion). Given that the Idemix model does not have, as
far as we know, an implementation on EC, we will focus on
the memory usage. In the rest of this section, we consider
a credential of n attributes to sign and verify. Results
presented below are based on papers [26][5][6][10][17] and
simplified schemes presented by Alpár Gergely[27][28].
6.1 Operations over curve comparison
In this first part of comparative study, we focus on
U-prove and I2PA schemes regarding operations on the
elliptic curve. We do not consider the hash function because
its fundamental property is that it should be very easy and
quick to compute. The comparison results are recorded in
"table 7".
Table 7: Operations over curve analysis
Protocol U-prove I2PA
Issuance (n+ 6).Ms + (n+
4).Ap
(n+6).Ms +
2.Ap
Verification 2.Ms + 2.Ap 2.Ms + 1.Ap
Table 7 shows that, what should be the number of
attributes to issue and verify, U-prove performs more oper-
ations in the curve than I2PA. In addition, the issuance is far
more expensive in U-prove than in I2PA especially when
the number of attributes grows. We can safely conclude,
without going wrong, that I2PA is more efficient than U-
prove in term of computing time when system’s parameters
are the same.
6.2 Memory usage comparison
In this second part of comparative study, we are inter-
ested in memory usage. We compare the number of bits in
the issuing phase. This choice is justified by the fact that, in
the verification phase, the verifier has nothing to store. We
adopt the following notation :
• T : Total of variables needed in this phase
• P: Total of variables to be stored permanently in this
phase
In addition, we assume that all variables of a protocol
have the same size and this size is the same that the security
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level. If in the Idemix model we work with 1024 bits, then
in I2PA and U-prove we can work with 160 bits expecting
the same security level [15]. Results obtained are recorded
in "table 8".
Table 8: Memory usage analysis
Protocol Idemix U-prove I2PA
User T : n+6
P : n+4
T : n+9
P : n+4
T : n+9
P : n+4
Issuer T : n+9
P : n+4
T : 2n+8
P : 2n+6
T : 10
P : 7
This table show that, at user side, I2PA and U-prove re-
quire around 1024(n+9) bits while Idemix requires around
1024(n+6) bits. However, at issuer side, I2PA presents inter-
esting results (around 1600 bits independent on the number
of attributes) compared to U-prove and I2PA that require
respectively 160(2n+8) and 1024(n+9). We can also see that
if implementation is based on RSA cryptosystem, U-prove
presents less interesting results than Idemix. Finally, we can
conclude that I2PA is very efficient compared to Idemix
and U-prove, the two leaders in terms of anonymous
credentials.
6.3 Feature comparisons
In this last part of comparative study, we focus on the
number of key features that need to be carefully considered
when tackling privacy concerns in an IoT context. We con-
sider three scenarios for a feature. It can be totally, partially
or not at all supported (not provided). The following legend
is adopted:
• X : Fully supported
• × : Not supported
• ⊘ : Partially supported
The "table 9" is a summary of features comparison.
Table 9: Features analysis
Protocol Idemix U-
prove
I2PA
fully blind signature ⊘ X X
Selective disclosure X X X
Randomization X × X
Untraceability X ⊘ X
Unlinkability X X X
Unforgeability X X X
small keys size × X X
small devices
efficiency
× X X
Bandwidth saving × X X
Idemix issuance is not totally blind because two of the
three parts of the resulting credential are known by the
issuer. These two elements are A and e of the signature
(A, e, v). In addition, this model is not optimal with low-
resource devices and bandwidth optimization. U-prove,
meanwhile, does not support the randomization feature.
Even if the signature phase is blind, the issues related to
traceability are not fully taken into account. Indeed, the
triple (h′, c′, r′) where (c′, r′) constitutes the signature, if
presented several times, may be traceable. The problem can
be seen in two angles. First h′ constituting the user’s public
key, is required in the verification phase. Since the latter
only depends on the signed attributes and the secret key
of the user, then the probability of having two credentials
with the same public key is almost zero. Secondly, lack
of randomization may be a problem. To guarantee non-
traceability in U-prove, one needs several credentials[12].
In our schema, the triple (h,R, c) can become (h,R′, c′)
where (R′, c′) is a random version of (R, c) without inval-
idating the signature.
7 CONCLUSION
Until a recent period, authentication without identifica-
tion was impossible. Anonymous credentials are a suitable
way to do it. In this paper, we propose an efficient Attribute-
Based Credentials scheme for IoT. We use Elliptic Curves,
Zero Knowledge Proof, Blind Signing, Selective Disclosure
and Randomization. Our scheme guarantees anonymity; a
fundamental aspect for privacy preserving. As stated in sec-
tion 5.2, our scheme is (ǫ′, t′, qi, qh)-secure in the sense of
unforgeability under chosen message attack in the random
oracle model. Complexities presented in section 6 show
that our scheme is very suitable with an IoT environment
with severely constrained resources. Future work would
include performance study, predicate proof over attributes,
inspection and revocation protocols.
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